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China's ForeiQn Policy_jn the

Mid-1990s 女

1. Introduction

Significant changes took place in the intemational system in 1989 when China' s foreign
relations , especially those with the Western

wor泊，

suffered severe setbacks

of the Tiananmen Incident. Despite the purge of Zhaωo

in 也e

Zi勾
ya
叩
ng 組dh
趾1S SU
叩
pp
仰
O口巾er吭
S丸，

aftermath
who

叭
\vere

accused of advocating
∞
C
ommun
凶
1吐ique

of the fourth plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese

Communist Pa訂rt句
y (CCP)

叫
r eleased

on June 24 , 1989 that 也e policies of reform and opening to

the outside world " will continue to be steadfastly carried out as before " and that China “ will
never go back to the old closed-door path ', -l

*

In November 1995 , 1 visited the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences , Beijing
University , the Central Party School , the China Institute for International Strategic
Studies as well as the

Shanσhai
。

Institute of Intemational Studies.

1 held extensive

discussions with over 50 academics and research \vorkers on Chinese foreign policy. To
facilitate exchange of ideas , they wiU not be quoted directly. Instead , their views will be
summarized and presented as those of the Chinese research community on China' s
foreign policy.

可γ

The 的nmunique of the fourth plenum also reaffinned that rÇhina ~ s independent , self-relian!

md peaceful

Dω叩叫icy yvollld 叫 change， and China would~ on the basis of the _Five~

Ennclp 1es 3f?prA1lco ﹒的 istence三 contjnue

to develop friendly relations \vith other

Cou的ies.2 )the Chinese leadership appe訂ed to be just as eager to attract foreign investment ,
-一一一

/

too. The authorities concemed \vere more willing to concede to reach agreements because
they felt their bargaining position had been weakened.

The

。在icial

mass media, too ,

continued to churn out success stories of foreign business ventures in China.

The CCP Political Bureau made the

followinσthree
D

observations on the world situation after

the Tiananmen Incident : (a) the Party Central Committee had not changed its basic views on
the global situation , the trends of detente between East and West had not changed , and
likewise the triangular relationship among the U.S. , the Soviet Union , and China; (b) China
would continue to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastem European
countries , but this improvement in relations could not surpass China's relations with the U.S. ,
Japan and the Westem countries; (cr China in the past had been too close to the West and the
rich countries , and had neglected

the 百世rd

W orld and the

old 臼 ends

in Africa.

China

therefore should strive to resume and develop relations \vith these old friends. 3 Like the rest
of the wOrld , the Chinese leaders had not anticipated the significant changes that ended the
Cold \Var and completely altered the intemational balance.

2

r""

ln the follo\ving two to three years , Gennany reunified; the former East European satellites of
the Soviet Union. abandoned socialism and opted for independence; and , finally , the Soviet
在于
Union disintegrated. ,These developments~ plus the impressive victory of the \Vestem
countries in the Gulf War , seemed to indicate that the U.S. had become the sole

ln 伽 w叫 There
∞
C
oun
叫tr可
y， 仁
~=hina

supe中O 叭.er

was a view in China ir

would become the next main target for the “ Pμea仗ce缸扣11

盯
e vo
叫lu
叫tiωon"

strategy of

吋
v ie\v.

One of the

伽 W卅
supporting Solidarity in Poland in the

pas泣t obv
叫iously

lent

suppo口 to

such a

notable proponents of this view was He Xin , a researcher of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences and member of the Chinese People' s Political Consultative Conference. ( ln an
、、、、--﹒

article entitled “ The Gulf War and China" , he wamed that after the Gulf War, the U.S.
、

-一-一一_.-

planned to shift its forces eastward to dominate Japan and China and establish an AsianPacific empire.

4
/

戶、
Further,

a丘er

the Tiananmen lncident , the demise of socialism in the Soviet Union and

Eastem Europe , the collapse of the Comrnunist regimes in these countries , and the general
trend of abandoning socialism and opting for capitalism in the Third World all exacerb?ted
the sense of insecurity among Chinese leaders.

•

They had to be given credit for not

responding to the domestic and intemational tunnoil by resorting to radical or isolationist

s叫es 。叫
leadership of the intemational communist movement and take up the responsibility of the
fonner So 叮 t Uni 叫 They were v 的 critical of 伽 a訓
t位t叮叩
叫
m
n叩
1甲Pω y川
the Uni 削 States and , to a
lesser extent , by other Westem countries to impose their systems and values on other
countries , but they consistently pursued their efforts of improving relations with the West

3

after the Tiananmen Inciden t.
policy of isolation and autarky.

川A 叭
1

They wanted to maintain a peaceful interna60n 月LenYironment to concentrate on China ~ s
modemization y hey

considered 伽t

intemational competition

in 伽 coming

decades \vould

be on the basis of “ comprehensive national po\ver ", and that China had \vasted much
precious time already. In the first place , China would have to make sure that its economic ,
scientific and technological gap \vith tbe advauced \Vestem

C011utγ~ould

and not widening. In terms ofper capita GNP , China wOllld like 10 catch up

be narro\ving ,

叫出 the

NIEs in

East Asia too. Further , China had to maintain a respectable growth rate in order to compete
with the ASEAN countries such as Th ailand , Malaysia and Indonesia. Finally, if the East
European countries were successful in their economic reforms , they could make good use of
their economic and technological base and could experience an impressive economic

tal仗，

off.)
/γ

of the _Soviet UniQn iI!!12Eed the disappearance . of the strategic triangle.
strategic terms , this meant that China could no longer exploit the

di 叮erences

v I 、

In

between the t\VO

superpowers and play one off against the other.J \ Thus , China' s strategic value , in the eyes of
>

the Westem countries , would be much depreciated when compared \vith that in the late
1970s , when Soviet military power reached its peak. Hence the Westem countries \vould be
less inhibited in criticizing and ex巳~ing pressures on China regarding issues ranging from
weapons proliferation to trade , human rights , etc

such criticisms and pmsum were

worsened by the fact that the newly-independent republics of the former Soviet Union all

4

l(

turned to the West for aid and guidance , and that the \Vestem media's perceptions of China
were turned one hundred and eighty degrees by the Tianarunen lnciden t.

1、--1

In contrast to the 1970s and the early 1980s, Chine~è leaders did not advocate for the broadest
~、、、

possible united front against the United States.( They also did not
contradiction in current international

relati吵 Analyses

identi令 the

principal

medi~

however,

in the official mass

令\~一~

tended to predict that the contradictions among the U.S. , the European Union and Japan
would be sharpening. Economic competition among the single European market, the North
Am erican market created by the North Am erican Free Trade Agreement and a potential East

Asian economic bloc would likely replace the military confrontation bet\veen NATO and the
Warsaw Pac t. Such analyses and commentaries also highI ighted the differences in

s甘ategic

interests between the U.S. and the Westem European powers , those between the U.S. and
Japan , and those among the major Westem European countries. Chinese leaders probably
appreciated that it would only be futile to appeal to the \Vestem European countries and Japan
to form

a 叫ed fì削 against the U.S.\

Their common interests still

outweighed 也elr

contradictions , though the latter would reduce the U .S. ' s capacity to dominate the \vorld.
/

The Chinese leadership ' s world vie\v continued to consider that Washington' s strategic focus
would remain in Europe and its f1 ank , the Middle Eas t.
S旦旦空里9_~~_ in

大ho豆豆h

the

U二S. em旦旦~ed asth~ only

the world afte~J.he Gulf \Var, it \yould not have the resources to play a more

significant role in the Asia-Pacific region. 6 The U.S. would also be handicapped by domestic
problems which generated demands to reduce resources for its foreign policy.

Chinese

leaders also believed that the end of the Cold War \vould enhance instability and facilitated
the re-emergence of various territorial disputes , ethnic contradictions and religious con f1 icts.

5

Some of these troubles would have an adverse impact on China,

as the
I

demonstration effects of the rise of ethnic-nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in the
nevvly-independent Central Asian republics on the national minorities in Xinjiang and Inner
孔1ongolia.

By 1992-93 , Chinese leaders became more relaxed with both the domestic and intemational
fron t.

Deng Xiaoping toured southem China in early 1992 to generate new impetus for

民rrther

reforms and opening to the outside world.

Chinese leaders appreciated that the

legitimacy of the communist regime would depend on its ability to deliver the goods. This
would be the most important guarantee against a repetition of what had happened in Eastem
Europe and the Soviet Union. In contrast to their

counterp訂ts

in these countries , Chinese

leaders, concentrated on economic reforms Erst aqd were able to significantly improve
people's living stand祕
Tiananmen Incident.

的

Hence they w竺只ble tol res心e politi叫 stability soon 伽伽

Three years after the incident, in view of the developments in the

former Soviet Union and Eastem Europe , most intellectuals in China were ready to accept t1:浮
crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in the surnmer of 1989/1 though they obviously
believed that it was gravely wrong to resort to the use of tanks and machine-guns. Th ey vvere
\villing to admit that there vvould be no substihlte for the communist regime. 1t seemed that a
vast majority of the people accepted the status quo, for they had an interest at stake to avoid
the chaos and turmoil that had emerged in Eastem Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Deng himself realized that history would be harsh on his role in the Tiananmen Incident , and
he became impatient with the austerity programme and the 毛主lanc己4 平pp~oach to economic
d竺三lopment adopted after the political crackdown in 1989.

6

Whi le he rejected political

(1ì抖v."

refonns which would erode the CCP' s authority and control, he intended to
China

fu口her

push

dO\Vll伽 road 心rket …ny. Æ心lÌc refonns 叫叫r 川 up

momenturn after Deng's southem tour , and foreign

investor~ .were

impressed by the fact that

China regained its momentum for market transfonnation so soon after the Tiananmen
crackdown. A

the W旦旦旦旦旦旦Ja w己re三~illi豆豆豆豆!3:?~De.?~__a v?te of confidence.

The Financial Time~ of London named Deng “ Man of the Year " for 1992 , and it noted that

in that year, “the f1 0wering of Chinese capitalism that he fostered became irreversible".

7

China' s foreign relations were back in full swing too. The Chinese govemment worked hard
at building or restoring its perceived rightful place in the world, and Chinese leaders should
be satisfied with their achievements by 1993 or SO.

8

They were then in a better position to

re-define their world view. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fading away
of bipolarity, Chinese leaders believed that a new pa位em of intemational relations was
pr~ cess

in 也e

of emerging. By implication , the present power configuration of “ one superpower, a

nurnber ofm吋 or powers" was only transitional. This stage of evolution, ho\vever, might last
for ten years and more. Unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese leaders' authoritative
statements on foreign policy did not comment on the danger of a \vorìd \var. Silence on this
topic might be constnled as treating this as a non-pressing issue. Instead , in their vie\v, China
should concentrate on the intennediate and long-term competition in building “ 川1 ‘
comprehensive national power " , and it should not allow itself to fall behind in this fierce
competition. At the same time, the view that China had become the major target ofthe U.S.'s

“ peaceful evolution" strategy was largely discredited , though it appeared to have secured the
endorsement of Chinese leaders in mid-1991. Chinese leaders then were highly critical of the
Bush administration's statements and efforts to spread the Western systems of liberal

7

democracy and market economy throughout the \vorld.

This position \vas seen to be

re f1 ecting the ne\-v arrogance and self-confidence of the U.S. as the only superpower in the
world. Obviously, if the Bush administration \vas serious in imposing \Vestem values on
other countries , China would be a major target:; Wh ile there had been considerable emphasis
in the Chinese analyses on the sharpening contradictions among the U.S. , \Vestem Europe
and Japan in 1991-92, this was toned do \\tTI in the follo\ving

ye位s.

As Chinese leaders felt

more secure , there was no need to give prominent coverage to the contradictions among
potential enemies. Ar guably there were even more troubles in the European Union in recent
years than in 1991-92 , but much fewer commentaries on the difficulties in the FrancoGerman relationship , the squabblings between the United Kingdom and other European
Union members , etc. , appeared in the official media.

Chinese military leaders were very concemed with the evolving strategies and capabilities of
the Am erican conventional forces. jfhey noted that the J:!.主巨些笠
C旦旦旦旦!世 so

hal f.

10

planned to 位豆豆豆 ts

that it could handle two regional co nf1 icts simultaneously instead of one and a

(fhe Western countries' attempt to re-define the role of NATO , 10 strengthen the

military role of the \Vestem European Union and to rely more on intemational organizations
su
川沁忱 Un心《均叫圳圳
前t吐
a
ω叫圳
iωlons

People' s Liberation Army (σPLA) leaders discounted the threat of a \vorld \va缸r or nuclear 丸W、:v訂雪
they found the maintenance of a forward military presence on the p訂t ofthe U.S. in the Asia-

叫 region a potenti叫lace. ~n N叫叫 U.S. Secretaηof State Jar叫ker
visited Beijing, and offered reassurances to the Chinese leadership. This paved the way for
considerable improvement in Sino- Am erican relations a丘er the Tiananmen Inciden t.

8

Chinese and Am erican leaders both adopted a pragmatic vie\v to adjust their bilateral
自!叫

也

Wh ile Europe was in tunnoil after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the
坐坐Eacific_ r_egi旦旦as r三世ivelLP~平左空空!:.

I

F or China, the most significant military 趾
t hre叫
剖t，
a

似附d

叫叫…川川d be
臼
臼I的…
e

lncludin 2: the Cambodian
旦旦旦旦Sula，

∞
c onili凶
~the

Af2: hanistan

apà

the Sino-Indian border disputes

ci討
l叫
Vli江1

the

war. the

con企ontation

im戶叭 beh，veen

in the Korean

Mμ九

它eCtAy1行

the two sides of the

Taiwan Strait ‘ had been eased considerabl ~\ In tl1~_ early 1990s, the restoration of diplomatic
ties with Indonesia was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relation~. with Singapore ,
Israel and South Korea. ßmperor Akibito ofJapa n vjsjted Cbjna in 1992
military security , ~hina

p的aps

enjoyed a better position in

Hen仲 in

theω!豆豆90s

tenns of

than at any

time 一

山U坦2一

At the same time e旦旦旦旦旦~ç~旦!).tradictio!ls among the U.S. , the European Union and Japan
竺竺e sh位E~ 豆豆.

They r守 ognized China as an important market 叫th great potential , and
‘ h.',F3
EL

A

月
L

China believed it \vould benefit from

0

mDAe

-1A

SEL +EE-

on

Apparently neither the Bush

administration nor the Clinton administration could focus on China after the collapse of the
Soviet Union , problems in Europe and the Middle East seemed to remain Washington ' s
strateglc focal points.

The Am erican government had certainly been handicapped by

domestic issues and lack of resources in assumingt:> a- si 2: nificant role in the Asian-Pacific
~~~

reglon. The economic difficulties and decline in living standards continued in the former
/

Soviet Union and Eastem Europe in the early 1990s. \ Thi s enhanced the acceptance of the

'l

9

.e,lC \

Chinese Communist regime by the Chinese people, and further reduced the significance of
the Russian threa t.

In sum , in the
foreign

mid-199 郎，

the Chinese leadership considered that it had pursued a correct

p圳r line. ~竺哩 recove叫企0叫

1989 , and it had adjusted \vell to the evolving post-Cold \Var international environment.
Meanwhile , the econo.my- continye d.-

to~

achieve respectable growth rates.

The Chinese

Academy_of SQcial Sciences indicated that China \vould become the \vorld' s third largest
economic power by 2010.

11

Its gross domestic product (GDP) was expected to grow at an

average annual rate of 9% between 1995 and 2000; and the average annual growth rate would
些e 川lan 7 叭叭 2001

and 201

11. Continuities in Chinese Foreign-Policy

Given the success of Chinese foreign policy in the first half of the 1990s, continuity will
likely be maintained in the foreseeable future. -The Chineseleadershio will still work hard to
s~cure

a peaceful

i n1ρ立lationa 1

\/

environment to proIDote economic development. I 1t believes

that the danger for a \vorld war or \vars among major po\vers involving China will be
relatively insignificant, and international competition \vill mainly be that 0f “ comprehensive

有

national power". This means that economic diplomacy \vil1 occupy. a prominent role: and it
τ三c. o.

G

will involve 生 following aspects. In the first place, development of good political
relationships is considered essential to the guarantee and promotion Qf foreignρc.onoml r.

\?

!ElftiffL叫 to removethe 伽

10

比“f

州ÇJ...vv\

V<Ji\L九九

i

more on economic means to realize its foreign policy objectives. Finally ,

diplo~atic

\vork

vJ ι

1月f1 11 increasingly in c1 ude bilateral and multilateral economic CQ叩eration. Cl)!ha not only
一-一一一一一-一一一一一一一

一一一一一一一一一-~--~ r'一一一

wants to maintain a peaceful international environment, it \vants to create a favourable
environment in support of its economic modemization.

12

Chinese leaders have a realistic assessment of the country' s economic potential. Wh ile they
nonnally express considerable optimism conceming China' s economic

outlook~

they are

淳朴

aware of China' s weaknesses. They do not want to play up various forecasts that China \vill
become the leading economic power some time in the next

centuη.

Obviously , in per capita

tenns , China's GDP in the foreseeable future \vill remain at the level of a developing country.
China is still receiving aid from the develope c;l cQuIltries and
組dρther

~ants

to continue to enjoy trade

privileges as a developing country. . Further, Chinese leaders intend to avoid

encouraging any talk of a

In the

mid-199 郎，

foreign policy analysts in China consider that the trend to\vards

multipolarity remains unchanged. In fact , it is probably progressing even more rapidly. They
note in particular that Gennany's intemational status has been improving and that the
relationship between Russia and the U.S. has coolled somewhat. The leftist forces in Russia
have to some extent recovered their strength~ and conflicts behveen Mosco\v and Washington,
D. C. have increased.

It seems that co-operation and competition \vill characterize this

bilateral relationship in the future.

Wh ile the political situation in Russia appears to be

stabilizing, Chinese analysts believe that the contradictions and crises cannot be resolved in a
fundamental manner in the near future.

According to their

0 bservations ,

the Clinton

administration has failed to come up with an effective strategy for the post-Cold War era; and

11

its

a位empts

SUIn,

to guide a ne\v Pacific community, too , have encountered much resistance. 1n

Chinese foreign policy experts consider that the global configuration of “ one

superpower, several major powers" is moving towards multipolarity , and they \velcome such
developments-13

In the a丘ermath of the Tiananmen Incident, Deng Xiaoping released a number of guidelines
for Chinese foreign policy. It appe訂s that these guidelines are still respected by Chinese )ð\\.\.d"q \.~ì這 b
leaders , and

they 訂e

often quoted by Chinese foreign policy researchers in the official think-

tanks. In a talk with leading members of the P訂ty Cen甘al Committee on September 4 , 1989 ,
Deng stated :“In short , my views about the intemational situation can be summed up in three
sentences. First, we should observe the situation coolly. Second , \ve should hold our ground.
在糾
Third , we should act cáltbry. Don't be impatient, it is no good to be impatient."I4 Earlier in

the talk , Deng had explained what he meant by “ hold our ground~'. He said: “ If, while these
countries (Eastem Europe and the Soviet Union) are in tunnoil , China doubles its GNP in real
terms for the second time , according to plan, that will be a success for socialism. If we have
basically realized modernization by the middle of the next
reason to

centu哼，

we shall have further

叫

Deng recomrnended caution and a lo\v profile too. He said: “ Of course , that will put the

~k ~l人

developed countries all the more on guard against us. Notwithstanding , we should maintain
Jriendly exchanges with them.
哇n~erstanding

\Ve should keep them as friends but also have a clear

of _~vhat they ar~ do~n_g. We should not criticize or condemn other countries

\vithout good reason or go to extremes in our \vords and deeds".16 Later, in another talk with
leading members of the Party Central Committee, Deng further stated :“Some developing

12

countries would like China to become the leader 0f the

TÞli止 \Vorld.

But \ve absolutel y'

cannot do that. This is one of our basic state policies. \Ve can't afford to do it and , besides ,

~e aren't stro月 en吋 T竺竺
竺
f竺三!坐三竺虫旦虫ot史也控旦
lose most of ourln
吋
1吐itia剖ti廿ve.'六川"川'仆17

Similarly , çhina had n o....intention of assuming leadership of the
abandonment of Marxism
Union.

-----

.

soci 月 lis.LcamD

after

the、

Leninism by Mikhail Gorbachev and the break-up of tl1 e Soviet

Though Deng played a crucial role in the polemics be t\veen

the 趴ro

叫

communist

parties in the early 1960s , he took a very different position in 1990. Deng cornmented on
March 3 , 1990 :“whatever changes j也e
expand

relations 叫 th

plac己 in

the Soviet Union , we should steadily

jt æ including political relations , on the basis of the Five Principles of

m~efrain from 紅皂白 over ideolQ只icaldifTerences"i8 This was in
accord with the Chinese foreign policy line since 1982 not to define a bilateral relationship in
terms of ideology.

Presumably the Chinese leadership today can also endorse another statement by Deng in the
same talk. Deng said :“ As for the two great issues of peace and development , the first has
not yet been

resolved 型 and

the second is even more pressing than before"., 19 Sln叫heωlY I\卅bVV\ v

mOs，如d especially 的r 19絨 China has been 吟出g to improve
ρiv

σ。-

n 『

'H,hu0 UTLQM

R

O

its relations

secure a peaceful environment for economic development.

restraint certainly facilitated a rapprochement

、;vith

\vi也 its 私仇

Deng's

self二

Russia soon after the coup in August

1991 , during which the Chinese leaders adopted a highly ambiguous stand. Boris Yeltsin
visited China in December 1992; and in th己 joint statement rissued , ~th countries declared
that they \vould develop

good-neighbourly，企iendly

13

relations of mutual benefit and co-

~~~
Russia con c1 uded an agreement to settle the disputes concemjng the Westem part of thelJ
border, and declared that

t~

would not aim their strategic nuclear

\vea口Qns

against each

些吋iang Zem
叫
mln 叫 V心uUSSl
昀臼划
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dψJ
9竺ofth白 4334-km

common

bo伽.Th立笠ould

not

e呼ge

in

c叫onta肋丸 nor wo圳事已。

they fonn an alliance , and their relationship would not be directed _against any third

coun叮

Thi s pa口ern of relationship would last into the next centuη，?t The Chinese Premier, Li Peng ,

also visited Moscow in June 1995 ,22 and Boris Yeltsin is expected to retum to Beijing in the
spring of 1996.

Wh en the Soviet Union disintegrated at the end of 1991 , the Chinese govemment promptly
竺ogniFed

the Russian Federation and the other eleven

峙中間re established 均idl y.

The Chinese

republicsu Diplomatic 主i竺i空空白rith

government 叫吋 cultivated

good

r削ons

with these countries and offered them govemment loans and commodity credits. Leaders
from these countries were invited to visit China and , in

1992-兒，

these countries visiting Beijing almost monthly.23

In 1994, Premier Li Peng visited

there were top leaders from

Uzbekistan , Turkmenistan , Kyrgyzstan , Kazakhstan and Mongolia.

During the visit, he

enunciated the four major principles governing China's relations with the central Asian
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Friendly relations and expanding economic ties with
China contain the

trouble 只 from

the _na1Ìonal

tbese 仲卅叫A.s.ian

mjnoritj 門iILthe

neighbours will help

~Y

'~ v~.)

provinces and autonomous
r/

regions in the

Northwes t. Negotiations at the expert level have been going on be t\veen China

on one side and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the other on the reduction
of military forces along the border

region 組d

confidence-building measures. By July 1995 ,

sixteen rounds of talks had been completed , and considerable progress had been made.

25

Fo l1 owing the departure of Soviet troops in 1992, Mongolia has not been a mjJjtary menace to

i心如

China. The threat has been of a different nature : its demonstration effect on InnerMongolia
and Tibet as a newly demQcratized counJryricl!t on China's doorstep Wh en Premier Li Peng
visited Mongolia in April 1994 , he stated that he “ respected Mongolia' s choice of its own
development course" . He also denied asking the Mongolian government not to support a prodemocratic movement in Inn叫0耶叭 To demonstrate its 忱pen
吋der
吋叭 ωala剖i La徊
m
was allowed

tωo 叫
v lS訓
i江t

Mongolia in September 1994, and the Mongolian foreign minister,

Tserenpiliyn Gombosuren , protested against Chinese nuclear tests in his address to the United
Nations General Assembly in the follo\ving month.

.A.pparently the Chinese leaders are

willing to tolerate such gestures now that wfongolia is outside the Russian orbi t.

China' s relations with India began to normalize in the second half of the 1970s when they
resumed the exchange of ambassadors.

At the end of 1981 , the tvvo countries initiated

negotiations at the vice-foreign minister level to resolve their outstanding issues. The breakthrough finally came when the late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in
1988. The visit was reciprocated by 也at of Premier Li Peng in 1991 . Sino-Indian relations yι0 ，
yeceDlρd.

a major boost from the disintegration of tbe Soyjet lJnion=- The

15

1豆豆er

could no

Y\'\\咐伽叫
' '11 \..,",,' - \
1

'

longer supply lndia with armaments and economic assistance. India also lost its strategic
value in the post-Cold War era and

~vanted

to introduce market reforms. \Vhen the Indian

Prime Minister P.V.N. Rao visited Beijing in September 1993 , the t\vo countries \Vere able to
conclude an agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquillitv along the line of de facto
control at the borde r. A joint working group had been fonned to tackle the border issue after
Rajiv Gandhi's visit , and various confidence-building measures had been a堅reed u四己
These included scheduled meetings of military personnel on both sides of the border, a “ hotline" between the military commanders of both sides , mutual notification of military activities
on the respective sides of the line of de factQ control , etc. Meanwhile , border trade and trade
expanded?7 It is not expected that the border issue can be resolved in the foreseeable future ,
but the two countries believe that they increasingly share common views on the establishment
of a new intemational political and economic order, and that there is considerable scope for
further expansion of trade and economlc co-operation.
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represented another achievement on the part of Cbjna to improve relations with its neighbours
i11 recent yea~. Since the late 198 此， China had used its status as a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Councjl to pusb for
the Cambodian civil
reached

aσreement

in

war~

p月廿布什 De~ 門 ti~tirm ，月 mang

the four parties in

After the five permanent members of the Security Council had

Auσust
o-~~

1990 on the
Å~~~

~~~~-

企ame\vork
_~_AA_..~...

documents concemin 2: the settlement in
-~-_..._...~

-~~~--~..--~O

Cambodia, China then stopped aid to its allies in Cambodia.

ln July 1991 , the four

Cambodian parties met in Beijing for a \vorking meeting of the Supreme National Counci l.
The Supreme National Council delegates were also received by Premier Li Peng.
Chinese vice-foreign minister Xu Dunxin, met his Vietnamese

16

counterp訂t，

The

Nguyen Duy Nien

市 CO

in Beijing in the follo\ving month; then in September, the Vietnamese foreign minister ‘
Nguyen ìvlanh Cam, travelled to Beijing for further talks \vith the Chinese foreign

minister~

Qian Qichen. Their discussions facilitated the peace agreement concluded in Paris in October
1991.

28

ντ

The Cambodian settlement paved the \vay for the resumption of full diplomatic relations
between China and Vietnam in the same year. Premier Li Peng visited Hanoi in December
1992 , at the end of \vhich Li stated言“we have much more common points than disputes~\29
Negotiations be t\veen Beijing and Hanoi were held on disputes over their common
land border, and some progress was achieved.

1 ， 130-kI叮

30

Since the 1970s , China has been able to maintain fjnendly ties with the Association of

huρ(-，1

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan. Though they are not vvithout problems , the

。毛心似/
丰.cc:).

peace 臼 1

relationships with rapidly expandingeconomic exchanges has been a kev component

ln China' s strategy of securing a peaceful international environment in support of its
modemization.

China's relations with Pakistan and B urma haye been Ímproving , t00.

Finally, China managed to establish diplomatic relations \vith South Korea in September
1992 without too much alienating North Korea. 1t had t a.tcen more than t\VO years for Beijing
to fo11o\v Mosco\v' s lead.

China no\v supports a dialogue be t\veen the

a社empts to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula.

31

t\vo

Koreas and

The Tumen Delta development project~

sponsored by the United Nations Development Prograrnme , involves not only China and
South Korea , but also North Korea , Japan , Russia and

17

~fongolia.

There is no reason to doubt that the post-Deng leadership wi l1 continue to value peace along
China's borders and co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region. In the middle of 也is decade ~
Chinese leaders still consider that the general 甘end is towards 色旦旦旦， though regional
conflicts and contradictions may \vell escalate. It is therefore more important to maintain
peace in the Asia-Pacific region which continues to
economic growth.

con甘ibute

to the region's spectacular

Troubles in other p訂ts of the world will keep the U.S. and the other

Westem powers occupied , and will only enhance the relative \veight of the Asia-Pacific
region in the intemational community. China welcomes multipolarity and the decline of the
rema1n1ng superpowe r.

111. The lmpact of the Leadership Succession

It appears then that the third generation of leaders have no major incentive to re-define the
foreign policy line. They are interested in securing and maintaining a peaceful jrltemational
cnvironment for China' s economic development=-- Th eir legitimacy will depend on their
ability “ to deliver the goods" , i.e. , to improve the living standards of the people when
expectations are nS1ng.

:e olitical

stabili切，

the leadership's most important concem in the
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neighbours would also helpto contain the problems of national minorities in the

bord~r

autonomous regions of Xinjian豆 ~Inner Mongolia and Tibe t.
一J

A number of new factors , however , have emerged in the mid-1990s \vhich will likely lead to
adjustments in China's foreign policy in the second half of the decade and beyond. In the
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first place , the

!豆豆dersh詛 Sl主豆豆豆豆豆ion

1n China will probably coincide with those in some key

\Vestem countries. Voters in the U.S. \vill elect a new President at the end of 1996 and
President Bi11 Clinton' s re-election is far from assured. The Republican-dominated Congress
wi11 challenge the Clinton administration' s China policy. Taipei will find more room for
maneuver in its lobbying efforts in the U.S. Congress , which will1ikely attack China' s policy
to\vards Hong Kong too. Jacques Chirac just replaced Francois

Mi位errand

as the

Fr也ch

President. The British, Gerrnan and Australian governrnents \vill have to call for elections in
one or two years and they a11 face up-hill battles to stay in power. The political situation in
Japan will remain unstable for some time.

Such a scenario reduces the probability for breakthroughs in China's relations with these
important Westem countries. Their China

policies 叫11

become more controversial. The

Westem media will also be more critical of the Chinese government, as doubts grow about
China's stability. At the same time , Taipei' s chance of securing diplomatic victories will be
correspondingly enhanced , as evidenced by President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Come11
University in June 1995 , follo\ved by informal visits of Premier Lien Chan to Austria ,
Hungary and the Czech Republic.

32

Changes of governments in the Westem countries 'vvill

create opportunities for discussions of their China and Tai\van policies as well as explorations
of various options available.

At this juncture, Beijing' s stand will likely be

inflexible ~

because in the leadership succession process concessions and flexibility on the Taiwan issue
\vill attract strong attacks from one' s political enemies.

1n the eyes of the present Chinese leadership and its successors , the \Vestem po\vers ,
especially the U.S. , will likely exploit the leadership succession crisis in Beijing to exert

19

pressure on China regarding issues ranging
proliferation to human rights.

企om

trade deficits and nu cI ear-\veapon

A weak and unstable leadership will find it difficult to

withstand the pressure pragmatically. Con f1 ict \vill easily escalate when competing leaders
tend to appeal to nationalism and patriotism to mobilize domestic support.

There is even a

view that the third generation leaders in the leadership succession process might seek to
exploit extemal co nf1 icts to maintain domestic solidarity or to shift the people's attention
away from domestic problems and economic difficulties.

可ι\ W 恥叭
The Sino- Am erican disputes over the Taiwan question symbolized by Lee Teng-hui's U.S.
visit will have long-term repercussions on the

bilate叫 relationship.

It was reported that liang

Zemin had been forced to make a self-criticism before the Central Military Commission for
failing to stand up to the U. S. 33

Even the recall of the Chinese ambassador to Washington ,

D.C. , Li Daoyu , was not considered adequate by the People's Liberation Arm y and the hardline Party

34

elders. .J~

The missile tests near Taiwan held in late July 1995 , however, helped to

rev竺~~ the p_olitic平1 fortune of Jiang.

35

The missile tests were a success臼1 deterrent against

the independence movement in Taiwan in the short
people of Taiwan

企om

te口九 but

they will further alienate the

Mainland China. Th e missile tests also vividly demonstrated that the

third generation Chinese leaders cannot afford to be flexible on the Tai\van issue. A hard-line
st型，

on the other hand , is

elders , two most significant allies in the competition for succession.

The People's Liberation Arm y apparently adopts a hard-line position on foreign policy. In
recent

ye位s ，

the military has been advocating a strong stand on Sino- Am erican relations and

issues ranging from human rights and nuclear-weapon proliferation to Sino-British quarrels

20

on Hong Kong.
已Q且豆豆豆豆 ions .

It has criticized the Chinese

fore這n mr哈叮 for

making too many

On the question of leadership succession , the military leaders will have

significant in f1 uence. They appreciate that Bonapartism would not be

acceptable ~

and \vould

be willing to settle for a king-maker' s role. They \vill likely press for the satisfaction of the
military ' s demands for more funds and more advanced equipment.

Regarding defence spending as shown in the budgets , the military has not done well since
1980. Defence spending in absolute tenns increased by 33 0/0 in 1979 , mainly because of the
war with Vietnam , then it fell by 13% in 1980 and 1981 respectively.

The increases 企om

1982 to 1988 were very modest : 50/0 in 1982 , 0 .4 4% in 1983 , 2% in 1984, 6% in 1985 , 4.8%
in 1986 , 4 .4% in 1987 and 4% in 1988. Between 1989 and 1994, the increases were more
substantial: 15 .40/0 in 1989 and 1990 respectively , 13.8% in 1991 , 14 .4% in 1992 , 12.7% in
1993 and 29.3% in 1994.

As a percentage of gross national product, ho\vever, defence

spending steadily de c1 ined , from 5.6% in 1979 to J豆豆s th旦旦 1. 3 0/0 in 1994.36

F~rther， a

considerable portion of the increases in defence funding had gone to ~且prove
remuneration

for 型lit也旦豆豆onne l.

One

estimate indicated that over 35% of the defence

budget was spent on personnel , and less than 27% on the procurement of equipment.
is not to deny that there is a hidden defence budget in
Chinese leadership ' s desire

th~

for 豆vi l-military

China~

37

Th is

especially in vie\v of the

integration , in c1 uding the use of dual-purpose

infrastructure and organization of supply ne t\vorks which depend on civilian resources.

38

It was not surprising that , under such circumstances , the People' s Liberation Army' \yould like
a stable , if not increasing , share of the country's

gr豆豆 s

national Droduc t.

session of the Eighth National People's Congress in March 1994 , 104

21

At the second

deputies 企om

the

military articulated this demand in the form of a signed proposa1.

39

1t has been speculated

that the military has been pushing for a strong stand on the Tai\van issue and Sino-i\merican
relations in the recent years exactly because it wants increased funding for its modemization.
---戶一一一一一-\\

The leadership succession process offers an excellent opportunity for the military because the
third generation leaders lack the status to contain its demand. They are probably eager to
please the military too , or at least they are reluctant to antagonize such a powerful interest
group.
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translated into expanding

milit的

flexing its muscles i n the South China Sea has been a case in point. 1n

1984 , the then commander of the Chinese

na句，

Liu

Huaqi時，

stated in an

interview 也at

the

navy' s main goal was to assert China' s sovereignty over its maritime resources , and that to
protect these resources China had to develop and modemize its navy.40

The Chinese naηr

obviously used the need to strengthen China's power projection capability over the South
China Sea to support its demand for enhanced budgetary funding , just like the People's
Liberation Anny as a whole exploited the Tai\van issue and deteriorating Sino- Am erican
relations. The Philippine military , too , made good use of the Mischief Reef incident in early
1995 to secure its Congress's approval ofits budge t. 1t has committed itselfto a US$2 billion
modemization oroσramme over the next five ye訂S-41
r~~~

The Chinese People's Liberation Army has been playing a typical bureaucratic game of Cl\ l\.\ ~ ItHι
securing more resources for itsel f.

1ts success will likely contribute to an escalation of

military ~旦旦di旦旦 in the re旦旦旦~ There is , however, no immediate cause for alann. F or
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example , Chinese leaders have been exercising considerable self-restraint in the acquisition of
an aircraft carrie r. They \vell understand 也at while it is relatively cheap to buy an aircraft
carner 企om the : former Soviet Union以fully equipping a carrier task force is very costly.
一一---\\\

Further, while ASEAN' s military expenditure went up in recent

ye訂s ，

amounting to USS12.7

billion in 1994 , this to some extent reflected the general prosperity of ASEAN and the
availability of funds.

Th立 biggest 缸mS_ Q\!yer

involved in the Spratly Islands dispute !}Qr did

among ASEAN

itxe也eive

\v~ Thailan~jL ~主$

China as a serious

not

I垣Jjtary_ threat.

The other big spenders were Malaysiit and Singapore , and they too did not feel seriously
threatened by China militarily. Above all , the political uncertainty in Japan and the economic
di伍 culties

in Russia and the other forrner Soviet republics mean that they would not

participate in an arms race in the near future. It is not in China's interest to provoke them to
do so.

Chinese leaders handled the Mischief Reef incident 叫出 care and restraint. They certainly
wanted to retain their Southeast Asian neighbours' benefit of the doub t.

But economic

considerations had provided new impetus for China's expansion of its power projection over
the South China Sea, beyond the Paracels and into the Spratlys. By the late 1980s , it was
clear that China \vould soon become a net oil importer; in 1992 , it became a reality.43
scramble for oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea by Vietnam and other

The

ASEA卦，

countries reflected the value of the area as well as the potential for co nf1 ic t. Am ong China' s
strategic planners , there is a strong

view 也at

China has to develop and use the oceans in order

to survive , given China' s huge population and the rapid depletion of its relatively poor landbased resource endowmen t.
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Burma. The Indonesian military believes that China's access to Burmese bases would pose a
threat to the Straits of Malacca.

l Ildi 'l, on the other hand , has been concemed with

Ch品位已\

assistance in building a deep-water 120rt at HainggYL Island , at the mouth of the Irrawaddy
Rlver.The Indian military suspects that the facility may be used by ~hiIlese submarines

o~

extended voyages to the Indian Ocean. It was also reported that China had been involved in
主->+r 丸

building an intelligence base on Great Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal. The facilities would
be deployed to monitor shipping and communications in the Malacca Straits and the Indian
Ocean, as well as Indian missile tests across the Bay of Bengal. Li Peng's visit to Burma in
December 1994 , th豆豆rst~uch high-level visit

since 旦旦1 ，- highlighted 也豆豆lQse _ßl世且取吐白

between the two countries-44

The leadership succession process has affected the Chinese strategic thinking in another

y
important way. The informal visit of Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. has much reinforced the
Chinese leadership' s suspicion of the U.S.

On the surface , both governments appreciate the

importance of the bilateral relationship. They would like to maintain high-level contacts to
ay oid misunderstandings and especially an escalation of tension between the

t旦旦 cou且tries .

They are aware of the unfavourable factors in each other' s domestic political

scene~

namely ,

the leadership succession complications in Beijing , the enhanced political inf1 uence of the
military and its demands, etc. on the part of China, and the challenge of the Clinton
administr叫on's

China policy from a Republican-dominated Congress , the changing

perception of the Am erican public against China, etc. on the

p訂t

ofthe U.S. Chinese leaders

in recent years have a much better understanding of the checks-and-balances system in the
U.S. , too. Hence , by late August , 1995 , the Chinese side could state that "the U.S. side had

24

fully realized the importance and sensitivity of the question of Taiwan to U.S.-China
relations".45 In the 1990s, Chinese leaders have been following Deng Xiaoping' s guideline
that China should avoid a confrontation with the U.S. and improve bilateral co-operation.

In the Chinese

leader泊中 's

world view , however , many conspiracy theories are gaining

credibility. Such conspiracy theories are broadly shared by foreign policy researchers and
intellectuals , too. The first theory is that the Westem countries in general , and the U.S. in
particular, do not believe that the Chinese leadership succession process will be smooth, and
they intend to take advantage of China's troubles ahead. Lee Teng-hui ' s informal visit has
been interpreted in this context. The 1.Z .~S~and ~h~ ~~ste~~ _~o~~trie~ would like to use the
Taiwan issue to exert pressure on China. Their cornmitment to a one-China policy has been
shaken, and they want to keep their options open in anticipation of China' s leadership
succession problems.

This line of thinking has its historical roots.

Back in the 1960s ,

Chinese leaders considered that the U.S. supported the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan to exert
pressure on China, and that it cultivated the Taiwan independence movement to exert
pressure on the Kuomintang regime. Related to this conspiracy theory is the strong sense of
insecurity and suspicion among Chinese leaders conceming the Westem countries “ peaceful
evolution" strategy against China.

A “ peaceful

evolution" strategy implies basic hostility towards the Chinese Communist

regime. Wh ile this theme had been down-played since 1992 , it re-emerged in different forms
in 1995 or slightly earlie r.

The Chinese leaders are worried that forecasts of China' s

economlc growth and reports on China' s military modemization and naval expansion would
be developed into hypotheses of China being a threat or future threat to the peace and stability

25

(l\ \ \瓜机

of the Asia-Pacific region and even of the world戶 The Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef
in the Spratly Islands and the strong protest by the Philippines in early 1995 triggered much
discussion of China as a threat. Chinese leaders fear that such perception of the Chinese
threat would offer support to the renewal of a strategy

t。“contain"

China. The deterioration

of Sino-Am erican relations in mid-1995 and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations
between the U. S.

個d

Vietnam similarly generated speculation of a "containment" strategy
-、\

against China 垣itiated by the 11 ~ .

也豆豆旦旦Ported

by

JaE鎧1， ASEA垃且d ~ietnam ._ Art icles

in

popular tabloids and academic joumals in China reporting such a “ containment" strategy
often also argued against further experiments with political and economic

liberalization ， 的

well as closer co-operation with those countries involved in the “ containment"strategy-47

Obviously such perceptions of the U.S. and China's Asian neighbours have strategic as well
as domestic political overtones. The latter may well be exploited by factions of the Chinese
leadership in the leadership succession struggles. In view of the bankruptcy of the appeal of
socialism and the moral authority of the Party , the third generation leaders often appeal to
nationalism and patriotism. It is significant to note that in a recent survey by Zhongguo
。 ingnian

BaQ of 100 ,000 young people in their twenties , 57.2% of the respondents chose the

U.S . as the country to which they had least goodwill , and 87 .1 % considered the U.S. the
countηr

most unfriendly to China. Incidentally , 96.6% of the respondents still felt angry

about Japan' s invasion of China.

48

Chinese people had very good impressions of the U.S.

after China' s opening to the outside world. Apparently , like the media in the West , there had
been a reversal of such impressions.

Official propaganda and the conspiracy theories

discussed above were important factors causing this reversal.

26
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In terms of foreign policy , these suspicions of the Westem countries have reinforced the
emergence of the “ strategic triangle" in the strategic thinking of the Chinese leaders , as well
as attempts to exploit the contradictions among Westem countries. 1n recent years , China
acquired considerable military hardware from Russia. , During Boris Yeltsin' s trip to Beijing
--一，一-一

可自-一

間內闡可

『月廿哼，-

郎_--d

_一一--一一一

ln December 1992 , he stated that China had bought US$1.8 billion of

arms 企om

Russia,

including twenty-six Su-27 fighter aircraft and ten IL-76 heavy transport planes. China also
purchased four batteries of S-300 high altitude surface-to-air missiles. Since then , it was
reported that China had secured two to four Ki lo-class conventional submarines and another
batch oftwenty-four Su-27s 少

n mid-1995 , when Sino- Am erican relations deteriorated , the

Chinese government was preparing for the second visit of Boris Yeltsin; and the author' s
interviews of Chinese foreign policy researchers and Russian diplomats in Hong Kong
indicated that both countries expected their military co-operation to advance further because
of the difficulties in Sino- Am erican relations. It has also been typical for Chinese leaders to
reward Westem countries with lucrative contracts in retum for their sympathetic stand
towards China on issues ranging from Taiwan to human rights , and to deny such contracts to
those which have adopted a critical and unfriendly position towards China. Such foreign
policy strategies and tactics are commonplace in intemational relations , but the Chinese
h::adership must not allow suspicions of the West to compromise its general objective of
句酌 'J售 1

securing a peaceful intemational environment for modernization. Sharpening contradictions
between the U.S. and Japan , for example , are certainly not conducive to peace and stability in
the. Asia-Pacific region.
」
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IV Conclusion : Towards a Long-term , Rational Foreign Policy

In striving for a peaceful intemational environrnent to realize China' s modemization
programme , the Chinese leaders pursued what they called an indepq生虫1位!~n hpolicy ~f
peace since about 1982-83.

50

It was well sumrnarized by Premier Zhao Ziyang' s ten

principles , in his report on the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90) to the F ourth Session of the
Sixth National People's Congress on March 25 , 1986.

51

Premier Zhao reaffirmed China's

position of never establishing an alliance or a strategic relationship with any big power, and
「一一-一-一一一】-一-﹒

一

that China's relations with various countries would not be determined by their social systems
and

ideolo星空Lqqo

also stated that China's position on various international issues would

些主 guped byt生criteria

of d街心g world

pea∞，

developing relations

。他endship

operation among various countries and promoting international prosperity.

and

∞

Despite the

Tiananmen Incident and the leadership succession complications , there is no reason to believe
that these principles will be abandoned in the future.

Since 1978 , economic reforms and opening to the outside world have brought China an r1A川
average annual growth rate of about 90/0 . Chinese leaders expect that such a growth rate wiU
be maintained in the near future and will only de c1 ine a little as the economy matures. China
needs a peaceful international environment , and it will try its best to secure such an
一一一一一一

environment in the foreseeable future. Despite various forecasts of China being the largest
economy in the world by 2015 to 2035 ,52 China's per capita GDP will remain at the level of
a developing

countηr

for many decades. After all , China's population is nine times that of

Japan. Even when the Chinese economy becomes the 1訂gest in the world , there is no basis to

speculate that tt will re-define its foreign policy i!.l a
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The legitimacy of the

Chinese Communist regime will depend on its ability to deliver the goods , and Chinese
leaders are acutely aware of this. The most optimistic assessment is that , in terms of living
standards of the people , China will need at least another century to catch up with the
developed countries.

C坐虫ilike 阿拉歹 ðee空i1self as
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force only when it experiences a sharp deterioration of the intemational environment.

That is why it is important for Chinese leaders to convince China' s neighbours of its

peace削

intentions , so as to avoid an arms race due to mutual perceptions of military threat. China
moved quickly to defuse the Spratlys dispute when the Mischief Reef incident caught the
Asia-Pacific region's attention.

In the ASEAN meeting in Brunei in August 1995 , the

Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, stated for the first time that Beijing would abide by
intemational law in sovereignty discussions with the claimants.

53

President Jiang Zemin

further wrote to President Fidel Ramos to guarantee that China would be determined to

主立91ve its dispute with the Philippines over the Spratlys in a peaceful manne r. 54 In retum ,
但

\s 、

President Ramos granted pardon to the sixty-two Chinese fishermen who had been jailed for
six months for poaching in the disputed Spratly Islands. 55
intemational environment certainly involves

establishing

Striving for a peacefu!

企iendly

relations with one's

neighbours and avoiding conflicts with them. This has probably been China' s most important
foreign policy objective since 1982-83 , and it has been achieving satisfactory results in the
1990s. This means advancing China' s national interest by force or the threat of force \vould
be very costly. By 1993 , 55% of China's foreign trade was with East and Southeast Asia. 56
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J
仰
izigg and improving relations with Russia and lndia despite
起立border

conf1 icts. .J.t can certainly do so with ASEAN , especially in view of ASEAN's

importance to China. The Chinese leadership has to be more pro-active though , so as to
dispel the speculation that China has expansionist schemes in line with its naval buildup , and
that its policy on the resolution of territorial disputes with its neighbours will change once its
has achieved the necessary power-projection capability. There are now ample channels to
strengthen mutual trust and engage in confidence-building. After its first formal meeting in
Bangkok in July 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum has certainly demonstrated its
importance as a regional security forum.

In the field of arms control and disarmament , China's declaration neither to be the first
q旦旦lear

主 the

weaR-ons , nor to use the Ill

ag，!!n~

non-nl!clear countries has

to 旦回

\yon considergbl旦旦旦I212QJ1

Third_ World. The same applies to its endorsement of the Latin Am erican nuclear-

weapon-free zone and other similar proposals. But its two nuclear tests in May and August
1995 attracted many

prot帥 China has said that it will tki all nuclear tests 你 the

intemational Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been signed, possibly in 1996. It was
reported that China had told Japan it would conduct two more underground nuclear tests
before the Treaty. The Chinese gesture was likely aimed at seeking Japan's understanding
and persuading Japan not to cut its low-interest yen loan package for China. 57

Such a

position re f1 ects a lack of sensitivity to intemational public oplnlon, and probably the
strengthening clout of the Chinese military.
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To reciprocate China's efforts to re-assure the international community of its intentions for
peace and development , the Western countries must seek to ayoid exerting unnecessary
pressure on China during its leadership succession process.

Construct1v~_ e Q.~gement

must

involve concrete measures to demonstrate that the Western world has no intention to take
advantage of China' s domestic problems , including the Taiwan issue; norto “ contain" China
and deny it of the support and access needed for its modernization prograrnme. Given the
historical factor , it is very easy for Chinese leaders and the Chinese people to feel that the
Western world and Japan fear competition from China, and do not want China to become a
strong and wealthy country. ln a recent statement on its China policy , the European Union
stressed the introduction of China into the mainstream of international economics and politics
and the avoidance of isolating the country.58 Hopefully , the statement will be followed by
concrete acts , and an example will be set for the U.S. and Japan.

ln sum , China' s long-tenn interests and objectives are clear. Since the early
been p'ursui I)g_a

s1.啥 ?s dIL moderni_zation

198 郎，

China has

diplomacy. Chinese leaders had adjusted to the

difficulties created by the Tiananmen lncident and to the major changes ofthe post-Cold War
power configuration.

Now come the challenges of the leadership succession process.

Suspicions of Westem countries , in f1 exibility on the part of the third generation leaders due to
the power competition, the increasing influence of the military , etc. may create problems , but
so far there have been no signs of a major re-definition of the foreign policy line.

China has not only accepted the existing international organizations , such as the United
Nations , World Bank, lntemational Monetary Fund , etc. , which it previously considered to be
t也Is

of Westem imperialist powers , it further expects them to play a more significant role

31

and intends to articulate and promote its interests through them. 1t is now the recipient of
most loans from the World Bank , US$22 .4 billion by the end of June 1995. 1t anticipates
another US$9 billion in the coming three years.

59

However , it has been shying away from

active leadership in these organizations. 1n the first place , it considers itself a major power
a旦d

a developing country , and it has no intention of leading the Third World. Second , it still

su旺ers

from a lack of seasoned diplomats and intemational civil servants. It must overcome

these handicaps in order to assume an appropriate role in intemational affairs.

This

eventually will improve China's image and erode its suspicions ofthe Wes t.

Finally , Çhina_~ust soon come up with a coherent regional policy , given its recognition of
the increasing significance of economic regionalism and regional trading blocs. 1n 1991 ~
China became a dialogue partner of ASEAN , a member of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, and expressed support for the Malaysian proposal for an East Asian Economic
Caucus excluding the U.S.

60

Directions for an institutional framework strengthening

economic co-operation among East and Southeast Asian countries are still very f1 uid , but they
will have an important impact on the roles ofthe U.S. and Japan in the region. China cannot
afford to be left out in shaping this institutional framevvork , but its position is yet unclear.
This is certainly an area where the third generation leadership can leave its mark.
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